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I.  Introduction
At the beginning of the nineties, a diversity of economic reforms were designed and
implemented to reduce the size of the country's public sector with the objective of making it
more efficient.  Despite the reforms, ten years later, the Colombian public sector is 80%
larger, and the financial sustainability of the Government presents serious problems. In
1999, Colombia's chief indicator of economic growth (GDP) was –4,3% and the
unemployment rate reached 20%. Such an evident dwindling of the economic activity has
been accompanied with imbalances in the macroeconomic accounts, particularly in the
public sector.
This paper provides a general description of Colombia's economic trends in the last
few years, closely examining the factors which have undermined the country's public
finances.  Section II contains an overview of the fiscal imbalances registered as of the
1960s, and their relationship with both the real business cycle and the tax policy. Section III
includes a synthesis of the main economic reforms introduced in the early nineties, and
compares the size of the Colombian public sector  with those of several neighboring
countries.  Section IV describes the key issues involved in the country's recent fiscal
imbalance and, Section V, analyses  the dynamics of the public debt and the question of its
sustainability.  The closing section outlines the policies for economic adjustment and
reactivation currently debated in Colombia.
II. Historical overview
1.  Fiscal imbalance trends
The Colombian public sector has registered two major fiscal imbalances since the
1960s. The first one occurred by the beginning of the 1980s, when both the central
government and the decentralized agencies recorded large cash deficits. The Non Financial
Public Sector (NFPS) deficit, which is the most common measure of the Colombian public
sector imbalance, reached 7,6% of the GDP both in 1982 and in 1983.  Of this deficit, 50%
was explained by the financial operations of the central government. Three years later, the
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NFPS deficit was adjusted thanks to an effective economic program.  Therefore, by 1986,
the public deficit was only 1,2% of the GDP.
The second major fiscal imbalance began by the mid 1990s and attained its critical
point in 1999. By this year, the consolidated fiscal accounts reached a cash deficit of 4,3%
of the GDP, due entirely to the financial transactions of the central government
1. Even
though the size of the last deficit is smaller than the first one, its adjustment could be more
complicated because it depends completely from the central government´s operations.  In
fact, the central government is currently facing serious obstacles to make successful fiscal
adjustments, because of the narrow margins of its expenditure policy as well as the modest
revenue increases gathered from several tax reforms.
Apart from these two fiscal crisis, fiscal data indicates that from the sixties, the
macroeconomic management of the Colombian public finances had not posed problems.
For instance, in the sixties, the government fiscal deficit was, in average, 0,6% of the GDP,
while the consolidated public deficit was 1,8%.  At such time, the government´s fiscal
results stemmed from a simple fiscal framework:  on the revenue side, income and imports
were heavily taxed; on the expenditure side, investment was mostly geared towards
building infrastructure.  The budged destined to public payrolls was negligible.
In the 1970s, the public deficit followed very similar trends.  The government´s
fiscal deficit  was, in average, 0,7% of the GDP, and the overall public deficit was around
2,2%.  Although, throughout the seventies, the government´s spending framework remained
the same, by the mid 1970s, significant changes were introduced to the the taxation scheme:
income tax rates were increased, and so was the tax imposed on the capital gains of
corporations.  These reforms as well as increases in the international coffee prices,
registered as of 1976, rendered additional resources to the public treasury.  Therefore,
between 1976 and 1978, the government attained a cash surplus of  0,5% of the GDP.
There is no question that the composition of  the public deficit began to change in
the 1990s. As it will be shown later on, both the introduction of major economic reforms
and the new rules imposed by the 1991 Political Constitution had a strong impact in the
shape of public finances. Until 1990, the central government´s deficit had been always
below the consolidate one.  For instance, in the sixties and seventies, the government´s
deficit was, in average, one third of the consolidated fiscal result.  By the 1980s, such
participation had increased to two thirds.  By 1990, the size of the government´s fiscal
imbalance was larger than the total public deficit.  This implies that throughout this period,
the remaining public agencies, reached cash surpluses in their financial operations.  This
was particularly true in the oil and social security sectors.
2. Fiscal balance and the real business cycle
The panel A of Graphic 1 shows the aforementioned fiscal trends as well as the
close relationship between the public fiscal imbalance and the real business cycle.  Times
of crisis for the public finances go hand in hand with periods of severe economic recession.
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1963 - 70 1971 - 80 1981 - 90 1991 - 00
GOVERNMENT  DEFICIT  0,59 0,68 2,37 3,14
NFPS  DEFICIT 1,83 2,17 3,84 1,69
ECONOMIC  GROWTH 5,23 5,53 3,43 2,71
GOVERN. TAX  REVENUE 7,08 8,45 7,93 10,14
GOVERN. EXPENDITURES 8,29 9,47 9,96 14,39
Source: Banco de la República
AVERAGE (Share of GDP)
Graphic 1 (Panel A)
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Between 1980 and 1982, the economic growth rate fell from 4,1% to 0,9%, while the public
deficit grew from 2,3% to 7,6% of the GDP.  By the end of the nineties, the situation was
very similar.  Between 1998 and 1999, the economic growth rate decreased from 0,5% to –
4,3%, while the consolidate public deficit increased from 3,4% to 4,2% of the GDP
(between 1997 and 1999, the government´s deficit grew from 3,7% to 6,5% of the GDP).
Consequently, graphic 1 illustrates that economic recovery and adjustments to the public
finances are concomitant.  This was clearly the case between 1984 and 1986, when the
economy´s annual growth rate raised above 5%, and the fiscal deficit decreased to moderate
levels (1,2% of the GDP).  Current fiscal policy aims at rendering similar results for the
years 2000 and 2001.
The inverse relationship between fiscal deficit and economic growth can be
explained by the fiscal automatic stabilizers theory.  Nonetheless, special attention must be
exercised when interpreting fiscal variables.  The theory defines fiscal automatic stabilizers
as a group of public revenues and expenditures associated to the real business cycle.  These
stabilizers “smooth” the size of economic cycles by stimulating economic activity in
periods of recession, or by decelarating it in times of high growth.  Fiscal policy may foster
or hinder the use of automatic stabilizers.  However, the level of economic openness as well
as the composition of the public revenues and expenditures determine the effectiveness of
these self-regulatory tools.
The average size of automatic stabilizers in the European Community countries is
0,5.  For developed, yet more closed, economies such as the United States and Japan, the
average size is near 0,3.  In Latin American countries, the size of automatic stabilizers
ranges from 0,25 in Brazil to 0,10 in Ecuador, Venezuela, and Mexico. In Argentina, the
automatic stabilizer is 0,17, while in Chile and Colombia, is 0,19 (Martner R, 2000).  A
contraction of 2% in the gap of the economic growth rate, with an automatic stabilizer of
0,19, will lead to the increase of the fiscal deficit in 0,38% of the GDP
2.
Panels A and B of Graphic 1 show the expected relationships between  economic
growth, the government´s tax revenues, and the fiscal deficit for Colombia. It is clear that
as a consequence of the economic crises of the early eighties, the government´s revenues
decreased from an average level of 9% of the GDP (between 1978 and 1981) to 7%
(between 1982 and 1983).  Not surprisingly, the government´s fiscal deficit registered an
increase of 4% of the GDP between 1979 and 1982.  During the second period of crisis, by
the end of nineties, the relationship between the government´s tax revenues and the
dynamics of economic growth is less clear, probably because major tax reforms were
introduced to compensate for the loss of fiscal revenues.
3. Fiscal policy
For the past twenty years, the Colombian government has resorted to an increasingly
aggressive set of fiscal reforms, as its discretional mechanism to foster social and economic
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welfare.  From a tax policy standpoint, the most important reforms are listed below (some
of them are represented in Graphic 2).
  In the 1960s, the Colombian tax framework was simple.   In agreement with
influential advisers, policymakers emphasized the role of taxation as an automatic
stabilizer
3. In the seventies, less emphasis was made on the stabilizing effects of fiscal
policy; and more, on the inequities and distortions that result from an unindexed income
tax.
  The major reforms implemented by the mid seventies increased the income tax rate
and its progressivity; incorporated into the tax base the income of public enterprises;
extended taxation to capital gains (on assets held for more than two years); rationalized the
tax treatment of interest incomes; and designed an income inflation adjustment scheme.
However, some of these measures were reversed after 1975 in the so-called period of
“counter-reforms.”
  In the eighties, fiscal policies began to have an impact on many areas. First of all,
by 1983, the general sales tax was transformed into a value added tax (VAT), which was
applied to a diversity of retailed goods and services.  Over the years, the VAT became a
leading source of income for the Colombian government, therefore its rates and coverage
were subject of frequent changes.  Currently, VAT revenues amount to nearly 40% of  the
government´s total tax revenues.  Next, by the mid eighties, policymakers began to favor
fiscal decentralization as well as the strengthening of regional and local budgets through
transfers made from the central government.  Last, in 1986, a major income tax reform took
place to stimulate savings and investment as well as to recover the original neutrality and
simplicity of the country´s tax system.  This reform ended double taxation on return assets,
reduced personal income tax rates, leveled the rates on corporation profits, and simplified
tax administration mechanisms in general.
  During the nineties, Colombia endured an unprecedented number of tax reforms
which were not based on a single set of guiding principles.  Some of these reforms were
directly associated to structural reforms implemented in other economic fields.
4  S o m e
other reforms were simply designed to help bridge the increasing gap between the
government´s expenditures and revenues.  Between 1990 and 2000, there were, at least,
eight national tax reforms, including an Executive Decree which established a temporary
tax on financial transactions. Graphic 2 illustrates how the common feature of all of these
reforms was the constant changes to the VAT´s coverage and rates.
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4 such as the opening-up of the economy,  the social security system,  or the fiscal decentralizationGraphic 2
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inventoriesIII. Structural reforms and the size of the public sector in the 1990s
In 1991, the new Political Constitution prompted fiscal decentralization as well as a variety
of financial, exchange, and social security reforms akin to the country’s emerging free
market policies (details in Hommes, Montenegro and Roda, 1994). A brief description of
the main policies introduced in Colombia in the early nineties maps out the behavior of the
country’s public sector in the last ten years.
1. The Reforms
A. Trade reform.  In Colombia, the opening up process began in 1990 with a trade
reform. Basically, prior-license requirements to imports were eliminated; the number of
tariffs and their levels were reduced; trade operations steps were simplified; and new rules
for the establishment of international trade agreements were formulated. These changes
were backed up with several  institutional adjustments such as the creation of : (a) a Foreign
Trade Ministry; (b) a financial institution (Bancoldex); (c) an agency to control illegitimate
trade practices and supply information about international prices (Incomex); (d) and an
entity to promote exporting (Proexport).
The average nominal tariff on imports went down from 49,4% at the beginning of
1990, to 11,7% by the end of 1991.  Nonetheless, despite the relative lower prices of
imports, they increased only gradually because of the uncertainties caused by the new
policies.  Likewise, the fiscal effects of the lower tariffs were negligible.
B. Labor and social security reforms. In general, the new labor policies were
designed to make the labor market more flexible. Until 1990, labor regulations in Colombia
had restricted the flexibility of the labor market, imposing additional costs to employers,
and generating uncertainly among them. The reforms sought to eliminate these obstacles.
They made possible the hiring of workers with contracts of less than one year, and their
annual salary-based benefits (locally known as cesantías) were no longer retroactive.
Likewise, there were fundamental changes in the social security system.
Essentially, law 100 of 1993 replaced the Government’s social security monopoly for a
dual system.  The objective was to extend coverage and to secure pension payments to all
current and future retired workers.  Nowadays, such a system operates either through
individual capitalization into private funds, or through deposits made into public agencies –
which continue to function as before the reform.  The fees charged to both employers and
workers were raised.  Moreover, this reform led many public entities to straighten up their
accounts –which had important fiscal effects.  Section III provides some additional
information on this matter.
C. Financial system reform. Colombia’s Political Constitution of 1991 established an
autonomous Central Bank responsible for maintaining the purchasing power of the
currency (Law 31 of 1992). To meet this objective, the board of the Central Bank draws8
and implements the country’s monetary, exchange rate and financial policies.  The main
fiscal effect of the new Central Bank is its inability to make direct loans to the Government
(the Central Bank cannot purchase public debt instruments in the primary market). The
Central Bank can offer direct credits to the Government only if all of the members of its
board of directors approve unanimously such a decision.  Nevertheless, this has never been
the case ever since the reform took place in 1992.  In addition, the law requires that as of
January 1999, all of the Central Bank’s open market operations must be carried out
exclusively with government securities negotiated in the secondary market.
The financial reforms also ended the Central Bank’s subsidized loans to specific
sectors, and drew the legal and economic conditions under which commercial banks could
become multibank institutions rather than specialized banks (Law 35 of 1993).  Likewise,
the new regulations eliminated obligatory investments for the banking system and
decreased the banks’ required reserves in the Central Bank. Last but not least, the financial
system was opened to foreign investment.
D. Exchange reform.  Under the new regulations, the central bank no longer kept the
monopoly to trade with foreign currencies. The market forces were left to determine the
exchange rate as well as the allocation of the foreign trade resources. The exchange control
mechanisms were modified and the financial institutions became more involved.  Anybody
could hold foreign currencies or assets, yet in limited quantities (Law 9 of 1991).  With the
introduction of these set of reforms, the Law 444 of 1967 on exchange transactions, which
had been enforced for the last twenty five years, was revoked.
  Between 1991 and 1994, there was a transition period towards a system of exchange
rate bands, which was finally established in February of 1994. Throughout these years, the
exchange authorities continued to announce on a daily basis the “official exchange rates”
according to the crawling peg system
5.  However, the bands system was dismantled in
September of 1999, partly as a result of  the speculative attacks associated to the high
vulnerability of the LAC capital markets to the Asian crisis.  Subsequently, a free floating
exchange system was adopted.
2. The size of the public sector
In clear opposition to the goals established by Colombian police makers, and unlike many
neighboring countries where important reforms were also implemented, the size of the
Colombian public sector increased considerably throughout the 1990s.  The non-financial
levels of the Colombian public sector comprise the Central Government, the social security
system, a variety of decentralized entities, a number of enterprises, and the provincial and
local governments.  As Table 1 illustrates, the total public expenditure between 1990 and
2000, went up from 20,4% to 37,7% of the GDP. This means that the size of the state
almost doubled in those years.  In fact, growth was registered for all levels of government,
except the enterprises.
   
                                                          














(CG) (SSS) (DE&E) (P&LG)
1990 5,4 2,6 4,3 8,1 20,4
1991 6,4 2,7 4,5 8,1 21,6
1992 7,5 2,7 4,8 8,1 23,1
1993 6,6 3,3 5,7 8,8 24,3
1994 6,6 3,9 6,0 9,5 26,1
1995 6,8 4,7 6,9 9,7 28,1
1996 7,7 5,6 7,6 11,8 32,7
1997 8,2 6,1 7,3 12,4 34,1
1998 8,2 6,8 6,7 12,3 33,9
1999 8,9 7,7 5,8 14,2 36,6
2000 pr 10,7 6,5 6,9 13,6 37,7
Source: DNP, CONFIS and BR
Pr: preliminary
Source: DNP, CONFIS and BR



















The fiscal decentralization process requires the transfer of  an increasing share of the
central government’s current revenue to the provincial governments.  Therefore, the
provincial and local governments must carry out expenditures. Between 1990 and 2000,
provincial and local expenditures in Colombia increased from 8,1% to 13,6% of the GDP
(Graphic 3).
Likewise, the Central Government has transferred a significant amount of resources
to the Social Security system. Through these resources, the social security institutions
increased their reserves and raised their spending from 2,6% to 7,7% of the GDP (between
1990 and 1999).  Interestingly enough, the expenditures of the Central Government, not
related to transfers, increased from 5,4 % to 10,7%, which contradicts the expected results
under a decentralization scheme. To sum up, nowadays, Colombia’s public sector is much
larger than the average for the Latin American region, mainly because of the country’s
expansive public spending.
Unfortunately, fiscal statistics for the year 2000 are not available for all of the Latin
American countries (LAC).  However, Graphic 4 illustrates the sharp increase in the size of
the Colombian public sector between 1990 and 1998 --the same period when neighboring
countries were decreasing their own public expenditure.  In 1990, public expenditure in
Colombia accounted for 20% of the GDP, a figure which was way below the regional
average of 28%.  Eight years later, Colombia’s public expenditure was 8 points above the
regional average.
Graphic 4 also shows  the decreasing trend in the public expenditure of several LAC
for the same period.  In Argentina, public spending went down from 22,3% to 20,4% of the
country’s GDP; in Mexico, from 29,6% to 21,6%; and in Chile from 39,3% to 34,5%.
Traditionally, Argentina and Mexico had had very large public sectors until the 1980s,
nonetheless the situation in both countries changed notoriously during the following
decade.
Graphic 4



































Average 1990 = 28,4
Average 1998 = 28,811
These figures indicate how the majority of the LAC made deep reforms in their
public finances, not unlike the Colombian ones, and with very similar motivations. Mexico
adjusted the administration of the tax system (to reduce tax evasion), and decreased the
income tax on enterprises between 1986 and 1991 from 42% to 35% (to stimulate private
investment). At the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina made strong cuts to its public
spending by decreasing wages, privatizing various enterprises, and decentralizing education
payments.
IV. The main public finances issues
Colombia’s fiscal unbalance of the last few years can be explained through a set of nine
issues closely related to public spending and revenue. The first six issues have to do with
the finances of the Central Government, and the last three, with the consolidated results of
the public sector at large.
  First, the decentralization process that begun by the mid 1980s and was subsequently
endorsed by the Political Constitution of 1991.  According to the Law 60 of 1993, the
Central Government must transfer an increasing share of its current revenue to the
provincial governments (from 38% in 1994, to 46,5% in 2001). Most of these resources
(close to 80%) must be devoted to basic education and health services.  Nonetheless, the
Central Government has actually allocated more than the obligatory resources to these
sectors, sometimes as a result of political pressures.
  Second, market reforms both in the social security and the financial systems. As
was mentioned in section III, the Social Security reform (Law 100 of 1993) straightened up
the Central Government’s accounts and increased its contributions to the social security
institutions.  Consequently, between 1990 and 2000, the Government’s transfers to the
social security system increased by 2,2% of the GDP (Table 2). On the financial side, the
reforms made impossible for the Central Bank to make direct loans to the Central
Government. Thus, the Central Government could no longer count with the Central Bank’s
subsidies to the interest rates, and the cost of new public credits went up significantly.
  Third, inflexibility of the Central Government’s obligatory spending, which is
comprised by the transfers to the Social Security system and to the provincial governments,
as well as the payment of interests of the public debt.  As shown in Table 2, such spending
amounted to 63,9% of the government’s current revenues in 1990. In 2000, the Central
Government’s obligatory expenditures went beyond 100% of its current revenues. This
means that at present, the central government has no discretionary margin to allocate its
current revenues.  In relation to the GDP, the Central Government’s obligatory spending
grew from 5,3% in 1990 to 14,2% in 2000.
  Fourth, the need to rationalize the country’s public spending, both at the central
and regional levels.  The Central Government’s operational expenditure grew up from12
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Interest 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,9 2,0 2,9 3,3 4,5
Internal 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,5 0,6 0,8 1,4 1,5 2,2 2,3 3,2
External 0,8 0,9 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,7 1,0 1,3
Transfers 4,2 4,2 4,9 5,7 6,1 6,8 8,0 8,0 8,7 10,2 9,7
Law 60/93 2,4 2,6 3,2 3,4 3,5 3,4 4,3 4,3 4,6 5,3 3,9
Social Security 0,8 0,8 0,9 1,0 1,2 1,3 1,6 1,7 1,8 2,0 3,0
Other 1,0 0,8 0,8 1,3 1,5 2,0 2,1 2,0 2,3 2,9 2,9
Obligatory Expenditures 5,3 5,4 6,0 6,9 7,3 8,0 9,8 10,1 11,6 13,5 14,2
Repayments on Debt 1,4 2,8 2,6 1,8 3,1 1,6 2,8 3,5 3,3 5,4 4,3
Obligatory Expenditures + Repayments on Debt 6,8 8,2 8,5 8,6 10,4 9,6 12,6 13,5 14,9 18,8 18,4
Interest 13,3 12,8 10,5 11,1 11,4 12,4 17,9 18,2 26,9 30,6 38,5
Internal 3,3 3,4 3,3 4,6 5,9 7,8 13,4 13,2 20,0 21,1 27,3
External 10,0 9,3 7,2 6,4 5,5 4,6 4,4 4,9 6,8 9,5 11,2
Transfers 50,6 45,1 49,5 55,5 60,4 68,0 76,3 71,3 80,6 94,2 83,7
Law 60/93 28,7 27,8 32,1 32,7 34,1 34,6 39,8 35,9 38,0 46,5 33,4
Social Security 9,4 8,9 9,4 9,9 11,6 13,5 15,4 14,8 16,8 18,7 25,7
Other 12,4 8,4 8,0 12,9 14,7 19,9 21,0 20,5 25,8 29,0 24,7
Obligatory Expenditures 63,9 57,9 60,1 66,6 71,8 80,4 94,2 89,4 107,5 124,8 122,2
Repayments 16,8 29,4 26,1 17,2 30,2 16,5 26,9 30,7 31,0 49,6 36,9
Obligatory Expenditures + Repayments on Debt 80,6 87,3 86,2 83,8 102,0 96,8 121,1 120,1 138,4 174,4 159,1
Source: CONFIS and BR
Shares of GDP
Table 2
Colombia: Expenditures of the Central Government 
Shares of Goverment's Current Revenues
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
TOTAL REVENUE 2.088 3.164 4.208 5.908 7.701 9.524 12.049 15.283 16.880 20.164 23.285
Tax Revenue 1.886 2.768 3.747 5.051 6.731 8.185 10.172 13.148 14.825 16.067 19.464
Other 202 396 461 856 969 1.339 1.877 2.134 2.055 4.098 3.821
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 2.269 3.232 4.858 6.284 8.628 11.462 15.776 19.787 23.821 29.033 35.231
Interest 262 365 407 582 780 1.036 1.879 2.485 4.090 5.026 7.698
Personal sevices 385 566 789 1.166 1.628 2.072 2.295 2.848 3.548 4.106 5.278
Transfers 998 1.289 1.917 2.923 4.146 5.704 8.014 9.753 12.259 15.472 16.752
Capital expenditure 408 610 797 973 1.339 1.746 2.316 3.169 2.280 2.255 3.194
Other 215 402 948 639 734 904 1.273 1.532 1.644 2.174 2.308
SURPLUS / (DEFICIT) -180 -68 -650 -376 -927 -1.939 -3.728 -4.504 -6.941 -8.868 -11.946
TOTAL DEBT 3.971 4.622 6.498 7.477 8.320 11.666 14.489 21.720 31.200 44.909 63.404
Domestic Debt 980 1.077 2.270 2.905 3.453 5.390 7.237 11.314 15.549 22.270 31.431
External Debt 2.991 3.545 4.227 4.572 4.867 6.276 7.253 10.406 15.651 22.639 31.972
CO-FINANCIAL FUNDS n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 520 738 979 809 537 n.a. n.a
TOTAL REVENUE 8,9 10,4 10,8 11,6 11,4 11,3 12,0 12,6 11,9 13,3 13,5
Tax Revenue 8,0 9,1 9,6 9,9 10,0 9,7 10,1 10,8 10,5 10,6 11,3
Other 0,9 1,3 1,2 1,7 1,4 1,6 1,9 1,8 1,5 2,7 2,2
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 9,6 10,6 12,4 12,3 12,8 13,6 15,7 16,3 16,9 19,1 20,4
Interest 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,9 2,0 2,9 3,3 4,5
Personal sevices 1,6 1,9 2,0 2,3 2,4 2,5 2,3 2,3 2,5 2,7 3,1
Transfers 4,2 4,2 4,9 5,7 6,1 6,8 8,0 8,0 8,7 10,2 9,7
Capital expenditure 1,7 2,0 2,0 1,9 2,0 2,1 2,3 2,6 1,6 1,5 1,9
Other 0,9 1,3 2,4 1,3 1,1 1,1 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,4 1,3
SURPLUS / (DEFICIT) -0,8 -0,2 -1,7 -0,7 -1,4 -2,3 -3,7 -3,7 -4,9 -5,8 -6,9
TOTAL DEBT 16,9 15,2 16,6 14,6 12,3 13,8 14,4 17,8 22,1 29,5 36,7
Domestic Debt 4,2 3,5 5,8 5,7 5,1 6,4 7,2 9,3 11,0 14,6 18,2
External Debt 12,7 11,7 10,8 8,9 7,2 7,4 7,2 8,5 11,1 14,9 18,5
CO-FINANCIAL FUNDS n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,8 0,9 1,0 0,7 0,4 n.a. n.a.
n.a. not available
Source: CONFIS and BR
B. Shares of GDP
Table 3
Colombia: Central Goverment Indicators 
A. Billons of Colombian Pesos13
2,5% to 3,6% of the GDP between 1990 and 1993.  Salary payments rose from 1,6% to
2,5% of the GDP between 1990 and 1995.  Moreover, the accounts of the Central
Government were affected by the creation of new kind of regional transfers, different to the
ones created by the Law 60 of 1993.  These new transfers took place through the so called
co-financial funds.  Unfortunately, the administration of these resources was heavily
influenced by domestic politics until 1998, when they ceased to exist.  Table 3 illustrates
that the co-financial funds represented  1% of the GDP in 1996.
  Fifth, the Central Government’s revenue.  There were eight tax reforms in Colombia
throughout the 1990s (Graphic 2). The most notorious changes were: (a) an increase in the
value added tax (VAT);  (b) adjustments to the income tax; (c) improvements in the tax
system administration; and  (d) controls to non legitimate imports, tax evasion and elusion.
Despite these reforms, Table 3 shows that the Central Government’s tax revenues increased
only 2,6% of the GDP between 1990 and 1999.  It is clear, then, that these policies had only
a short term impact.  However, the Central Government gathered additional resources from
profits coming from the Central Bank and public enterprises such as Ecopetrol (the public
Oil Company). Additional sources of income for the Central Government were
privatizations (mainly in the banking and electricity sectors), and concessions (mainly in
the telecommunications sector).  In 1994, the Central Government obtained 2,1% of the
GDP from concessions, while in 1996 and 1997, 0,7% and 0,4% of the GDP came from
privatizations.
  Sixth, the Central Government’s increasing credit requirements.  The large gap
between the Central Government’s expenditures and revenues led to the swift development
of a deep fiscal deficit, which rose, from 0,8% of the GDP in 1990, to 6,9% in 2000. The
financing of this deficit as well as the repayments of the public debt, lead to the Central
Government’s increasing demand for new credits.  These new credits went up from  2,2%
to 11,2% of the GDP between 1990 and 2000 (Tables 2 and 3).  The sustainability of such
an accelerated increase in the level of the public debt became a serious problem for the
country’s Government --as will be analyzed in more detail in section V .
  Seventh, the provincial and local finances.  From the early nineties, Colombia’s
Central Government largely increased its transfer of resources to the provincial and local
administrations.  Consequently, the regional public spending expanded notoriously.  Table
4 shows how the total regional spending increased by 6,1% of the GDP in the last ten years,
while the regional tax revenue increased only by 0,8%.  Between 1991 and 1999, the
regional expenditure in salaries went up from 3,3% to 5,1% of the GDP. Moreover, by the
mid 1990s, transfer funds began to be used as a kind of collateral for banking credits.  By
December of 1999, the debt of the regional governments with the domestic financial system
had grown to 2,1% of the GDP.  For the same year, the fiscal deficits of the provincial and
local governments together amounted to  1,3% of  the GDP.
  Eighth, the Social Security surplus. After the reform of the Social Security system,14
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 pr
TOTAL REVENUE 1.796 2.363 3.152 4.266 5.938 8.100 10.719 14.160 16.030 19.556
Tax Revenue 495 641 834 1.126 1.583 2.002 2.566 3.192 3.647 4.340
Other 1.300 1.723 2.318 3.140 4.355 6.098 8.153 10.969 12.383 15.216
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 1.904 2.460 3.175 4.478 6.432 8.172 11.880 15.107 17.377 21.555
Interest 125 184 296 251 389 609 816 957 1.322 1.422
Personal sevices 770 990 1.328 1.743 2.359 3.047 3.963 4.771 6.459 7.715
Transfers 111 134 129 185 245 317 458 662 752 755
Capital expenditure 465 618 789 1.128 1.782 1.960 3.041 4.317 3.871 4.869
Other 434 534 633 1.172 1.656 2.239 3.601 4.400 4.974 6.793
SURPLUS / (DEFICIT) -108 -96 -23 -212 -494 -71 -1.161 -947 -1.347 -1.998
TOTAL REVENUE 7,6 7,8 8,1 8,3 8,8 9,6 10,6 11,6 11,3 12,9
Tax Revenue 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,2 2,3 2,4 2,5 2,6 2,6 2,9
Other 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,4 7,2 8,1 9,0 8,7 10,0
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 8,1 8,1 8,1 8,8 9,5 9,7 11,8 12,4 12,3 14,2
Interest 0,5 0,6 0,8 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,8 0,9 0,9
Personal sevices 3,3 3,3 3,4 3,4 3,5 3,6 3,9 3,9 4,6 5,1
Transfers 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5
Capital expenditure 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,2 2,6 2,3 3,0 3,5 2,7 3,2
Other 1,8 1,8 1,6 2,3 2,5 2,7 3,6 3,6 3,5 4,5
SURPLUS / (DEFICIT) -0,5 -0,3 -0,1 -0,4 -0,7 -0,1 -1,2 -0,8 -1,0 -1,3
pr: preliminary
Source: BANCO DE LA REPUBLICA.
Table 4
Colombia: Indicators of Provincial and Local Governments 
A. Billons of Colombian Pesos
B. Shares of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total  Expenditure  20,4 21,6 23,1 24,3 26,1 28,1 32,7 34,1 33,9 36,6 37,7
Central  Government 5,4 6,4 7,5 6,6 6,6 6,8 7,7 8,2 8,2 8,9 10,7
Social Security System 2,6 2,7 2,7 3,3 3,9 4,7 5,6 6,1 6,8 7,7 6,5
Decentralized Entities and Enterprises 4,3 4,5 4,8 5,7 6,0 6,9 7,6 7,3 6,7 5,8 6,9
Provinces and Municipalities   ** 8,18 ,18 ,18 ,89 ,59 ,71 1 ,8 12,41 2 ,31 4 ,2 13,6
NFPS  Surplus (+) or Deficit (-) -0,5 0,0 -0,2 0,2 0,1 -0,3 -1,7 -2,8 -3,6 -4,3 -4,3
Central  Government -0,8 -0,2 -1,7 -0,7 -1,4 -2,3 -3,7 -3,7 -4,9 -5,5 -6,9
Social Security System -0,1 -0,1 0,1 0,5 1,1 1,9 2,0 1,1 1,2 0,9 1,8
Decentralized Entities and Enterprises 0,3 0,3 1,4 -0,1 0,8 -0,2 0,2 -0,1 0,3 0,7 1,2
Provinces and Municipalities   ** 0,10 ,00 ,00 ,5- 0 ,30 ,3- 0 ,2 -0,1- 0 ,3- 0 ,4- 0 ,4
Privatizations 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,2 0,2 0,8 3,3 0,5 0,3 0,4
NFPS Surplus (+) or Deficit (-)  -Net of privatiz.- -0,5 0,0 -0,2 0,2 2,3 -0,1 -0,9 0,4 -3,1 -4,0 -3,9
Revenue of ISS 1,51 ,51 ,61 ,82 ,32 ,8 2,92 ,62 ,92 ,52 ,7
Source: DNP, Confis and BR
 *    Net of Transfer
 **   Including: Local Government and local enterprises
Table 5
Colombia: Non Financial Public Sector Indicators  *
(Shares of GDP)15
Colombia’s leading public social security institution (the ISS --Instituto de los Seguros
Sociales), which covers nearly 62% of the country’s insured workers, increased its
resources from 1,8% of the GDP in 1993, to 2,9% of the GDP in 1998 (Table 5).  This
surplus was invested in the Central Government’s securities.  By the end of 1999, the ISS
held $6,2 billions (4,1% of the GDP) in TES B, which are the most important securities of
the Central Government (this amount represented approximately 30% of the total TES B
issued).  From a fiscal point of view, the social security sector reached a cash surplus of
1,6% of the GDP between 1994 and 1997, which compensated the deficit of the Central
Government.
  Ninth, fiscal revenues coming from specific public enterprises.  In the seventies
and eighties, Colombian public finances were heavily influenced by the international prices
of coffee.  Coffee prices under the international agreement of producers had been steadily
high.  When such an agreement ended, in the late 1980s, coffee prices plummeted and so
did coffee’s contribution to the country’s public finances.  In the nineties, Colombia turned
to its oil reserves and embarked on several exploration projects, led by the public oil
enterprise (Ecopetrol), as well as by various transnational companies.  The high
international prices of petroleum in the last couple of years have rendered Ecopetrol large
revenues, which have contributed to neutralize the Central Government’s unbalanced
accounts. In 1999, Ecopetrol’s cash surplus was 0,73% of the GDP.
Overall, the nine issues described above indicate that the fiscal unbalance of the non
financial public sector in Colombia has sharply increased, particularly after 1995. Table 5
shows a relative financial equilibrium in the first half of the nineties as well as an
increasing deficit in the second half of the decade (from 0,3% of the GDP in 1995 to
4,28% of the GDP in 2000).  As a result of this fiscal trend, the public sector at large has
widely increased the size of its domestic and foreign debt.  The following section outlines
Colombia’s public debt evolution.
V.  The dynamics of public indebtedness  and the question of its
sustainability
This section provides, firstly a brief description of Colombia's accelerated process of
public indebtedness in the last five years (which is most evident in the case of the Central
Government); and secondly, an analysis of the debt’s sustainability as well as of the
country's vulnerability to external shocks.
1. Public indebtedness
A. Indebtedness of the Non-financial Public Sector. Starting in 1995,
Colombia's public debt skyrocketed.  Between 1995 and 2000, the consolidate public debt
of the NFPS climbed from 24,9% to 46,2% of the GDP -not counting the Central16
Government's social security liabilities (Table 6). The total of such an increase was
explained by the Central Government's indebtedness.
In the first half of the nineties,  the ratio public debt/GDP went down as a result of
(a) economic growth and (b) the public sector's decreasing need of new credits.  As it was
already mentioned, the public sector gathered substantial resources from the sale of assets
and the concession of licenses, which were used to make pre-payments of the external debt.
Between 1992 and 1994, the Central Government along with other national entities, made
pre-payments for a total of US$3,193 millions. By that time, the value of the foreign debt
was US$10,089 millions.  Not surprisingly,  the ratio external public debt/GDP dropped
from 26% to 16% between those two years.
Between 1997 and 2000,  public indebtedness levels reached a critical point. The
foreign public debt rose from 14,1% to 23,8% of the GDP, while the domestic public debt
went from 14,9% to 22,4% of the GDP.  The Central Government's indebtedness accounted
for 80 % of the increase of the total debt.   Likewise, the rest of the NFPS foreign
indebtedness was on the rise. Between 1996 and 1999, it climbed from 5,6% to 6,2% of the
GDP.  We will now examine the Central Government's indebtedness, because of its
predominance, and because of the limited information available on the structure of the
provincial and local debt.
B. Indebtedness of the central government.  Between 1995 and 2000, the Central
Government's indebtedness rose from 13,6 % to 36,7% of the GDP (Table 6). By the end of
the nineties, the foreign and domestic debts were almost similar in size (50,4% vs. 49,6%,
respectively). At the end of  2000, foreign liabilities reached US$14,325 billions and were
represented as follows: 54% in bonds; 30% in from the multilateral credit system; 14% in
from the commercial banks; and the remaining balance, in credits with foreign governments
and other agencies. Foreign indebtedness was usually negotiated in the medium and long
terms.  Regarding the currencies used, 82% was negotiated in American dollars; 8,2% in
euros; 1,2% in yens; and the rest, in other currencies.
The indebtedness strategy followed by the Central Government after 1992 consisted
of substituting the external debt by domestic indebtedness. The main instrument employed
were the so called TES B bonds. The Treasury issued them for the first time in 1992, when
the domestic debt accounted for 33% of the total indebtedness. By the end of 2000, these
leading governmental securities represented 88% of the total internal debt. Currently, the
Central Government counts with other securities, yet the TES B continue to be paramount.
Some decentralized government agencies, such as
the Agricultural Development Bank (Finagro) and the Deposit Insurance Fund (Fogafin)
have placed their own bonds. By the end of 2000, these entities’ share in the public debt
bond market was of 20%.
Although financial reforms aimed at allocating resources through market
mechanisms, large portions of the Central Government’s securities were placed by other
means. As some studies point out, perhaps the strongest restriction to the placement of the
Government’s securities is the segmentation and thinness of the Colombian public bonds




















1995 7,4 6,8 14,2 6,2 4,5 10,7 13,6 11,3 24,9
1996 7,2 5,6 12,8 7,1 4,7 11,8 14,3 10,3 24,7
1997 8,6 5,6 14,1 9,4 5,5 14,9 18,0 11,1 29,0
1998 11,1 5,8 16,9 11,1 5,4 16,5 22,1 11,3 33,4
1999 14,9 6,2 21,1 15,0 5,0 20,0 29,9 11,2 41,1
2000 * 18,5 5,3 23,8 18,2 4,2 22,4 36,7 9,5 46,2
* Preliminary
Source: Banco de la República
Total
Table 6
Colombia: Stock of Public Debt
Shares of GDP
External Domestic
Source: Banco de la República
Grapic 5
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Public Sector 12.529,7 43,2
      Social Security 1/ 6.915,8 55,2
      Enterprises 2/ 1.342,3 10,7
      Others 3/ 4.271,7 34,1
Central  Bank 1.799,2 6,2
Financial Sector 5.809,9 20,0
Private Sector 8.891,0 30,6
Total 29.029,9 100,0
1/ including: ISS, Cajanal, Caprecom and others.
2/ Including: Ecopetrol, Telecom, Isagen, Sena and others.
3/ Including: TGR, ICBF, Bogotá, FNC and others.
Source: Banco de la República
Table 7
Colombia: TES B and TRD by Holders
December 200018
YEAR Effective Devaluation New debt
Nominal Real Nominal Real
1993 29,0 5,2 7,5 9,0 26,7 3,3
1994 25,0 2,0 8,0 3,4 7,3 38,7 13,1
1995 25,4 5,0 6,4 18,8 4,7 33,1 11,4
1996 27,1 7,9 7,3 1,8 7,8 28,0 5,2
1997 25,3 8,4 7,2 28,7 7,9 24,4 5,7
1998 26,6 11,2 8,4 19,2 8,2 34,3 15,1
1999 22,1 13,2 8,2 21,5 10,0 15,8 6,0
2000 23,9 13,9 8,4 19,0 n.a. 13,4 4,2
Source: Banco de la República
Colombia: Interest Rates
Table 8
Effective End  period
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1994 - - 51,90 51,9 - - 48,1 48,1
1995 13,3 - 49,7 63,0 -0,3 - 37,3 37,0
1996 21,6 11,3 42,2 75,1 -0,2 -0,2 25,3 24,9
1997 7,1 28,8 37,0 72,9 1,5 -0,5 26,0 27,1
1998 13,4 30,1 31,0 74,5 1,0 1,0 23,6 25,5
1999 6,4 36,6 26,0 69,0 4,4 2,0 24,7 31,0
Source: Hernandez-Lozano-Misas (2000)
Table 9
Colombia: Interest Payment Determinants - On Central Government Debt-
Domestic Interest Payments External Interest Payments
Percentages19
liquidity from some public agencies (particularly, national enterprises and social security
institutions), and from the banking system.
Policy makers designed three mechanisms to attract resources through the TES B:
(i) direct transaction with the Treasury (inversiones forzosas), in which the bonds (as
collateral) cannot be traded in the secondary market; (ii) transactions with the ISS (main
social security agency), in which the ISS is capable of buying TES B directly from the
Treasury, or in the second market (inversiones convenidas); and (iii) auctions, which are
explicit market mechanisms. Its clear that the first two strategies are institutional
agreements rather than market mechanisms.
Graphic 5 illustrates the composition of TES B investments, as related to these three
mechanisms, during the second half of the nineties.  Forced investments (inversiones
forzosas) went down from 24% in 1995, to 18% in 1998; arranged investments (inversiones
convenidas) went up from 40% in 1995 to 98% in 2000; the auction mechanism kept its
participation around 24% until 1999, and then its share decreases to 1,1%. Consequently,
the arranged investments were the most dynamic channel.
From a bondholder standpoint, Table 7 displays the main TES B holders up to
December of 2000.  The public sector (including the Central Bank) holds 49,4% of these
securities; the financial sector holds 20%; and the private sector, 30,6%. As far as the
public agencies are concerned, the social security system holds 55% of the TES B; and the
enterprises, 11%. Therefore, public entities have kept the majority of these securities
The interest payments made by the Central Government on new domestic and
foreign credits have increased since 1995. This is another trait of the indebtedness process
of the Central Government. For new external credits, the average weighted interest rate
grew from 4,7% in 1995, to 10% in 1999 (Table 8). Furthermore, the Colombian spreads in
the foreign capital market begun to rise in November of 1997, as a consequence of the
international financial crisis (Graphic 6).
Up to October of 1997, Colombian spreads, in average, were about 200 basic points; eight
months later, they had climbed to 600 basic points. In addition, the Colombian peso has
depreciated in the last three years. The real exchange rate index rose approximately 30
points between June of 1997 and December 1999.  Hence, the cost of foreign debt went up
from 0,5% in 1995, to 1,3% of the GDP in 2000 (Table 2).
The interest rate that the Central Government was paying for its internal debt also
begun to increase after 1996. Table 8 illustrates that the effective real interest rate grew
from 5% in 1995, to 13,9% in 2000 (9,7% above the real market interest rate). The cost of
government securities depends upon the interest rates negotiated. By the end of 1999, 74%
of the domestic debt in TES B was negotiated at fix rate, while the rest, was settled with a
floating interest rate. Thus, the domestic interest payments of the Central Government’s
debt went up from 0,6% to 3,2% of the GDP between 1994 and 2000.
To sum up, high interest rates as well as the government’s accelerated process of
indebtedness increased the government’s interest payments from 1,2% of the GDP in 1995,
to 4,5% by 2000. However, the main cause of such an increase was the indebtedness policy
itself (which reflects the fiscal unbalance). Table 9 shows that, by the end of 1999, the
accumulation of the primary deficit explained 50% of the total interest payments --out of
which, 43% was related to the domestic debt.  The rest  is explained by the capitalization of20
the initial stock of debt (details of the exercise are available in Hernádez, Lozano and
Misas, 2000).
2. Debt and fiscal sustainability
Our analysis of Colombia's fiscal sustainability starts by understanding that  "debt
sustainability is an integral element of macroeconomic stability. Interactions between
different policy variables (such as debt, fiscal and interest rate policies), and outcome
variables (such as GDP and exports growth), as well as international economics conditions
(international interest rates) jointly define if the country is on a sustainable debt path"
(Ghani and Hyoungsoo, 1995). An accurate forecast of the debt's path must then, be based
on reliable information on all of these variables. However, most  empirical studies on fiscal
sustainability are accomplished through two simple yet useful approaches.
A. The standard debt sustainability approach. The debt sustainability analysis
is, in essence, a fiscal sustainability analysis. Consequently, "what matters is whether the
fiscal stance (present and projected) will permit repayment of the current stock of debt. If it
does not, policy prescription will focus on fiscal adjustment measures to increase future
primary surpluses" (Perry, 1997).
The implications of this quotation are better understood  by examining the
determinants of the debt's changes, as defined in the Fisher and Easterly tradition.
6
According to these authors, the ratio debt/GDP changes positively as a function of the
difference between the real interest rate and the growth rate of GDP. Moreover, the ratio
debt/GDP increases with the primary deficit, and decreases with the seignorage. These
assertions are useful tools to describe the Colombian situation for the last few years.  In
simple terms, they indicate that  the debt of the Central Government has been negatively
influenced by: (i) low economic growth; (ii) high real interest rates; (iii) an increasing
primary deficit; and (iv) a decreasing seignorage (caused by a decreasing inflation trend).
Graphic 7 illustrates some of these developments. Panel A, compares the dynamics
of the government's debt with primary deficit trends since 1990. At the beginning of the
decade, the government's finances had a primary surplus of 1% of the GDP. This primary
fiscal unbalance increased to 2,5% of the GDP by 2000. The fiscal issues outlined in the
fourth section of this paper further explain that the primary unbalance is the leading cause
of the accumulation of the government’s debt.
Panel B illustrates  the dynamics of both, the real interest rate and the rate of
economic growth. The large gap between these two variables during the second half of the
nineties, led to the further expansion of the governmental debt. The most critical period was
reached between the fourth quarter of 1997 and the fourth quarter of 1999, when such a gap
hit a maximum of 18,8 points.  Moreover, a decreasing inflation trend in the last few years
                                                          
6 The Fisher  and Easterly paper was published in The World Bank Research Observer, in July of 1990. Their
finding is given by:  s pd d g r d      ) ( , where d = debt/GDP; pd = primary deficit/GDP; s =
seignorage;  r = real interest rate and g = real growth rate.21
Graphic 7
Source: BR and Confis
Panel A





























Total Debt Primary deficit
Panel B


















has led to a shrinking of the seinorage (Panel C).  By 1992, seignorage amounted to 2,9%
of the GDP (on M1); by 1999, it amounted to 0,4% (Posada, 1999).
If Fisher and Easterly’s equation is used to calculate the level of the government’s
primary surplus, two aspects must be considered in an exercise to keep constant the
government's debt level for the year 2000. First, the new liabilities of the government; and
second, the variables included in the exercise. Between1999 and 2000, the Central
Government faced a deep crisis in the financial system, which was particularly related to
the financing of housing. To solve this crisis, the Government issued a new type of bonds
(locally known as Law 546 and TRDs). Moreover, the Government was forced to close
some public entities. By the end of 2000, the new liabilities of the Colombian Government
amounted to 6,7% of the GDP; thus, the government’s new level of indebtedness is close to
37% of the GDP.
7
The second aspect is the set of variables included in the sustainability exercise.
From a long term perspective (1980-2000), the real interest rate was 7,5%, and the real
economic growth was 4,5%. Furthermore, the inflation forecast is below 10%, which is
compatible with a seignorage of 0,4%. Within this context, in the upcoming years, the
Central Government will generate a primary surplus of about 1,1% of the GDP --
depending, of course, on adjustments to the fiscal policy.
B.  Financial institutions approach.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
The World Bank (WB) have suggested a set of guidelines for public debt management.
8
These guidelines, which comprise a great variety of indebtedness issues, provide policy
makers with sound advice on how to improve the quality of their public debt management,
and how to reduce their countries vulnerability to international financial shocks.  From a
macroeconomic perspective, it is also important to monitor a variety of internal and
external indicators, to be able to assess the debt sustainability and the vulnerability of a
small country such as Colombia.  As the IMF and the WB point out, “...Vulnerability is
often greater for smaller and emerging market countries because their economies may be
less diversified, have a smaller base of domestic financial savings and less developed
financial systems, and be more susceptible to financial contagion through the relative
magnitudes of capital flows...” (IMF and WB, 2000).
Several ratios, commonly used to predict solvency, are helpful to examine debt
sustainability as well.  Among them, we have revised:  (i) External Indicators:
reserves/short term external debt; reserves/imports; external debt/imports; and external
debt/exports.  (ii) Central Government Indicators: tax revenue/debt service; and interest
payments/total revenue.  (iii) Non Financial Public Sector: debt/GDP. Table 10 displays
the behavior of these ratios along the nineties and, for some of them,  projections for the
period 2001 and 2002.  These projections are based on several assumptions on the
country’s economic performance, which is in turn contingent upon the implementation of
fiscal reforms aimed at reducing the primary deficit.
                                                          
7 The 6,7% of the new government liabilities is given by:  2% from bonds law 546; 3,7% from the public
banking capitalization (bonds -Fogafin); and 1% from the cost of closing public entities.
8 Draft Guidelines for Public Debt Management, IMF and WB, 200023
2000 2001 2002
C entral G overnm ent 1,9 1,0 0,6
Budget Adj ustment 0,5
Growth i n Economi c Acti vi ty 0,2
M anagement of the Tax Admi ni strati on 0,2
Reducti on i n Fl oti ng Debt 0,5
Fi nanci al  Transacti on Tax 0,5
Transfers (to Provi nci al  and Local  Gov.) 0,4 0,4
Tax Ref orm 0,6 0,2
Provincial and Local Governm ents 0,5 0,6 0,0
Soci al  Securi ty Fund -Pensi ons- 0,3 0,4
Addi tti onal  Adj ustm ent 0,2 0,2 0,0
0 ,3- 0 , 50 ,4
To tal A dju stm en t 2,7 1,1 1,0
New Fiscal Unbalance 3,6 2,5 1,5
Source:  Hernandez and Lozano (2000)
Ot her  adj ustm ents 
Table 11
Col ombi a:  Pr osp ects on Fiscal D eficit A dj ustm ent
Shar es of  GDP
Average
1990-1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999    2000 pr 2001 2002
General Indicators
GDP  (MM$) 42332,8 84439,1 100711,4 121707,5 141740,5 152165,0 172638,0 197692,2 221415,3
GDP  (Millons US$) 59899,2 92539,1 97148,0 106718,8 99045,5 86550,8 82675,8 n.a n.a
GDP (Growth Rate)  4,3 5,2 2,1 3,2 0,4 -4,3 3,0 3,8 4,8
Exports  (Millons US$) 7565,0 10095,33 10523,91 11529,35 10944,3 11573,34 13043,0 13662,0 14376,0
Imports  (Millons US$) 7168,6 12922,67 12783,6 14371,37 13691,93 9955,864 10780,0 12323,0 12803,0
Reserves  (Millons US$) 6934,9 8446,4 9933,034 9905,16 8739,791 8102 8809,7 9784,0 10107,0
Fiscal Indicators
NFPS Fiscal Deficit (% GDP) -0,08 -0,3 -1,7 -2,8 -3,6 -4,3 -4,3 -2,5 -1,5
NFPS Expenditures (Billons $)  1/ 10.091 23.723 32.899 40.887 47.396 57.665 65.256 n.a n.a
NFPS Revenue (Billons $)   1/ 10.135 23.461 31.190 36.897 42.562 51.324 57859 n.a n.a
NFPS Debt  (Billons $)    n.a. 21.066 24.829 35.352 47.369 62.490 79.801 n.a n.a
S. Term Public Debt (Billons $)  2/ 682 1569 1173 1209 1505 1255 439 n.a n.a
NFPS Interest payments (Billons $) 1.424 2.777 3.908 4.113 6.521 5.712 4.568 n.a n.a
Sustainab. / Vulnerabil. Indicators
Reserves / S.T. External Debt 249% 156% 200% 208% 187% 193% 175% 151% 171%
External Debt / Imports 285% 193% 231% 223% 248% 347% 309% n.a n.a
External Debt / Exports 247% 247% 280% 278% 310% 298% 255% n.a n.a
Reserves / Imports 104% 65% 78% 69% 64% 81% 82% 79% 79%
External Debt / GDP 32% 27% 30% 30% 34% 40% 40% n.a n.a
CG: Tax Revenue / Debt-Service  277% 339% 216% 196% 168% 122% 129% 117% n.a
CG: Interest Payments / Revenue 11% 11% 16% 16% 24% 25% 33% 29% n.a
NFPS: Interest Payments / Revenue 14% 10% 11% 11% 14% 15% 20% n.a n.a
NFPS Debt / GDP n.a. 25% 25% 29% 33% 41% 46% n.a n.a
 1/ Net of transfers.
2/ Including: Central Bank, Decentralization Entities, Central Government,Banks and other Financial Corporations. 
* Preliminary
Source: Banco de la República
Table  10
Colombia: Selected Economics Indicators
Projectios24
The erosion of Colombia’s main economic variables since the mid nineties is evident from
the data.  Regarding the vulnerability indicators, the ratio reserves/short term debt, which is
a measure of reserve adequacy in countries with significant but uncertain access to capital
markets, went down from an average of 249% between 1990-1994, to 175% in 2000. If
official predictions are right, by the end of 2002, such a ratio will decrease to 171%.
Interestingly enough, Argentina registered similar reserve adequacy levels in 1999, and
official estimates predict their fall to 150%. The other external indicator, useful to assess
vulnerability, is the ratio reserves/imports (a measure of reserve needs). Between 1990-
1994, this ratio was in average 104%.  Subsequently, it went as low as 64% in 1998.  By
2000, it registered an increase to 82%, which is near to the average level predicted by the
Colombian authorities for the next few years.
As it was mentioned, debt sustainability analysis involves external and internal
indicators. The ratio external debt/exports is a measure of the trend in debt, which is closely
related to the repayment capacity of the country. Between 1990-1994, this ratio was 247%
(in average).  Thereafter, it increased to 310% by 1998.  In 2000, it fell to 255%. Likewise,
the ratio external debt/GDP, which is a useful indicator for relating debt to resource base
(reflecting the potential of shifting production to exports as to enhance repayment
capacity), went up between the first and the second half of the nineties (in average 32% in
the first half on 1990s, and then went up to 40% in 2000). The projection of these external
ratios is contingent upon economic recovery.
Regarding public sector indicators, their reversal trend between the first and the
second half of the nineties is clear. Between 1990-1994, the ratio tax revenue/debt service
(for the Central Government) was in average 277%. Thereafter, this index decreased, and
by the end of 2000, it went down to 126%.  Official expectations about changes in this
index are modest, because of the current high level of indebtedness, and because of the
short term maturity. Between 2000 and 2002, the maturity of the TES B placed until 1999
is 60%.
The ratio interest payments/revenue (also for the Central Government) was in
average 11% between 1990-1994.  Thereafter, it went up to 32% by 2000. In the last few
years, the high cost of the Central Government’s debt, along with its dwindling tax
revenues have become increasingly evident. The reversal of these trends depends upon an
upswing in economic activity as well as the approval of a sheer tax reform, currently
debated in Congress.  At last, as it was mentioned in the previous section, the ratio public
debt/GDP has increased since 1995.  In 1995, this ratio was 24,9% and by 2000, it had
increased to 46,2%.
VI. Final remarks
From the mid 1990s, the Colombian economy has endured a pattern of slow growth and
expanding economic unbalance, particularly of its fiscal accounts. As discussed in this
paper, these trends are related to unsustainable fiscal policies, external shocks, as well as
the country’s internal political turmoil (which was not mentioned explicitly).  In December
of 1999, the Colombian economic authorities subscribed a three-year agreement with the25
IMF, to restore long term economic growth, reduce inflation even further, and achieve an
external sustainable position.  This agreement requires strong fiscal adjustments, a
restructuring of the financial sector, and a flexible exchange rate policy, among other
structural reforms.
From a fiscal standpoint, the main reforms comprise:  a tight wage policy; a tax
reform; a redesign of the transfers policy; reforms in the pension system; and a downsizing
of the public sector through privatizations.  Through these set of reforms, the Colombian
authorities expect the NFPS fiscal unbalance to go down to 1,5% of the GDP by the year
2002. Table 11 depicts the path to such a result. Fiscal adjustments are geared to reforms on
the Central Government’s accounts.  Such reforms are expected to yield 3,5% of the total
fiscal deficit reduction (throughout a three-year program). The adjustment of the provincial
and local finances will render 1,1%.  The remaining percentage of the fiscal adjustment will
result from other actions.  Some adjustment policies, such as cuts to the national budget,
setting a longer period for the financial transactions tax, and the creation of the social
security provincial pension fund were implemented by the end of 1999. By the time this
paper was written, the Colombian congress was debating a set of additional reforms.26
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